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Abstract: This article introduces the topic of pandillas (street gangs) and their im-
plications for security in Central America. There is minimal scholarly literature on 
 pandillas and security. In part this is due to serious challenges in analyzing pandillas. 
First, pandilla members consider truth to be situational; data derived directly from 
them is suspect. Second, those who know most about them are involved in NGOs that 
rely on foreign assistance for their work. The project reports they produce go to funders 
abroad and are generally not published. Third, to research and write on pandillas is 
dangerous.
The 2010 Latinobarómetro documents with representative sample survey data 
what many citizens and observers have already experienced and decried: “Since 
2004 there has been an uninterrupted increase in the perception of crime (delin-
cuencia) as the main problem in the region, from 9 percent to 27 percent in 2010, 
the highest point since we began to measure” (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2010, 
12). In this same survey the spontaneous mention of crime as the main problem 
in the region was 43 percent in El Salvador, 35 percent in Guatemala, and 25 per-
cent in Honduras (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2010, 15). The perception is but-
tressed by the fact that homicide rates in the region are the highest in the world, 
with El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras averaging 63 homicides per 100,000 
(UNODC 2011, 23). The geographically very distant, Buenos Aires–based Red de 
Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL) in July 2011 began publishing 
Índice de seguridad pública y ciudadana en América Latina, concentrating its fi rst edi-
tion on El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (RESDAL 2011).
In the context of a high concern about crime, there seems to be no doubt that 
the role of pandillas, or street gangs, is important. There is, however, still little 
scholarly literature whereby a serious student can begin to understand this topic, 
let alone its implications for security. José Miguel Cruz edited one small and very 
limited book in English, Street Gangs in Central America, with a print run of 550 
(Cruz 2007b), and Dennis Rodgers as well as Sonja Wolf have produced several 
very good articles (Rodgers 2006, 2007; Rodgers and Muggah 2009; Wolf 2011a, b, c, 
2012a, b). There is a dichotomy between roughly the law enforcement  community, 
The present article grew out of a nine-year research project that resulted in the publication of Maras: 
Gang Violence and Security in Central America, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau, Lucía Dammert, and Eliza-
beth Skinner (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011). The views expressed in the book and in this 
article are the authors’ alone and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Navy or the 
Department of Defense.
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on the one hand—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and local police forces 
in the United States, and the national civilian police forces, at least in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras—and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), think 
tanks, and some scholars in Central America and the United States, on the other 
hand. While the former tend to prepare reports and compact discs for meetings 
and conferences of like-minded law enforcement personnel, the latter also pre-
pare reports and CDs. In neither case are the reports and CDs widely dissemi-
nated.1 There is minimal cross-fertilization. A number of serious diffi culties face 
researchers on this topic. First, it is widely recognized, and even codifi ed in Cali-
fornia law, for example, that pandilla members approach truth as situational, and 
this fact impedes data collection through the standard instruments of surveys.2 
Second, few researchers are objective. The law enforcement community tends to 
overdramatize the threat of the pandillas in order to increase their budgets. The 
NGO and academic researchers rely on foreign funds for their work, and some 
of their reports are infl uenced by the orientation of their funders. Furthermore, 
it can be very dangerous to conduct fi rsthand research on the pandillas, because 
their main identifying characteristic is the widespread use of violence. This vio-
lence is easily directed toward others, even potential friends, particularly when 
drugs are involved, as they very frequently are. There is the example of Christian 
Poveda, who fi lmed what most outsiders considered a favorable documentary on 
the Calle 18 pandilla, and who was assassinated by a member of that group on 
September 2, 2009; his killer was subsequently killed by a member of that same 
pandilla. (Personal communication from Sonja Wolf, who worked with Christian 
Poveda on the fi lm La vida loca. On the fi lm, see Wolf 2011b.)
The purpose of this article is modest: to establish a baseline of knowledge on 
pandillas and security in the region. I will provide information on nine different 
topics that in some way condition or defi ne the pandillas in Central America and 
their implications for security. Together, these topics will provide the reader with 
an overview to better begin to understand the phenomenon.
THE PROPITIOUS CONTEXT FOR THE GROWTH OF GANGS
The countries in Central America—Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama—are new democracies, with the exceptions 
of Belize and Costa Rica. Until the mid-1990s, they were all under nondemocratic 
rule in which the armed forces, along with other security forces, supported au-
1. The author has available CDs from the antipandilla conferences held in San Salvador between 2005 
and 2008 with wide participation from police forces in the region, the FBI, and some local US police for-
ces. A fairly representative collection of NGO and academic papers, sponsored in part by the Washing-
ton Offi ce on Latin America (WOLA), can be found in WOLA, “Transnational Study of Youth Gangs,” 
March 30, 2007, http://www.wola.org/publications/transnational_study_on_youth_gangs.
2. For example California law, 125 Cal. App. 4th 1195, 1201–1202, states: “A member gains respect 
within the gang by lying to the police, fabricating defenses, misidentifying people, hiding evidence 
or aiding in the escape of a gang member who commits a crime.” In my experience in Guatemala with 
ex–gang members, the lying extends beyond the police to any outsider. After sizing you up, the gang 
member tells you what he determines most useful for the situation at hand.
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thoritarian governments and prevented an opposition from organizing and mo-
bilizing. Various groups came into violent confl ict with these repressive regimes. 
In Nicaragua, the Frente Sandinista para Liberación Nacional (FSLN) took power 
through a revolutionary insurgency against the country’s right-wing dictator-
ship in 1979. Throughout the 1980s, with support from the Soviet Union via Cuba, 
the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador 
engaged in a vicious internal confl ict with the authoritarian government. In 
Guate mala, several armed opposition movements fought one another and Gua-
temala’s violently repressive, junta-led regime for thirty-six years (Woodward 
[1976] 1999).
Political peace became possible across Central America with the end of the 
Cold War and the separate but interrelated dynamics of confl ict in each country 
(the virtual stalemate between the government forces and the FMLN guerrillas 
resulting from their fi nal offensive in November 1989, the electoral defeat of the 
FSLN in 1990, and the victory in 1996 of the Guatemalan Army). Furthermore, in 
all but Honduras, which did not experience the same armed confl ict as the others, 
the peace processes were brokered by the United Nations with support from other 
countries. In all cases, the negotiations included measures to establish electoral 
democracies.
In a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on economic and social indi-
cators, all four Central American countries under consideration here are classifi ed 
as lower-middle income. Gross national income per capita covers a wide range: 
El Salvador, $2,850; Guatemala, $2,440; Honduras, $1,600; and Nicaragua, $980 
(Gomez-Granger 2009). (Within the region, only Haiti is classifi ed as low income, 
with an average per capita income of $560 before the January 2010 earthquake.) 
The United Nations Human Development Report aggregates various measures 
of health, education, and access to economic opportunity, and ranks countries ac-
cording to how well they meet these basic needs; the lower the number, the more 
developed the society. The United Nations Development Program ranks coun-
tries on a composite index, and the countries of concern here are ranked as fol-
lows: El Salvador, 107; Guatemala, 133; Honduras, 120; and Nicaragua, 129 (UNDP 
2013). For comparative purposes, the United States is 3, Haiti is 161, and Costa 
Rica is 62. In short, the four Central American countries focused on here are less 
developed.
In addition to their political and socioeconomic weaknesses, these societies 
face vulnerabilities that have been outlined in an infl uential UN report specifi -
cally focused on crime and its impact on development in the region (UNODC 
2007). The report highlights the main vulnerabilities: geography; demographic, 
social, and economic conditions; weak criminal justice systems; the region’s long 
history of confl ict and authoritarianism; and population displacement and de-
portation. Although it is based on abundant data, however, the report has a major, 
and common, fl aw in that it fails to differentiate between countries regarding the 
implications of these vulnerabilities. What this UNODC report can do is sketch a 
background of conditions in the region, against which this article will organize 
and highlight specifi c problems and issues in each country that can have an im-
pact on the rise of the pandillas.
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The Problem of Geography
The report begins with the observation that Central America’s vulnerability 
to crime is due to its “misfortune of being placed between drug supply and drug 
demand” (UNODC 2007, 25). In addition to drugs, Central America’s proximity 
to the United States makes it a natural corridor for the traffi cking of fi rearms and 
people as well. The geographical explanation hinges on the extreme disparity of 
wealth between the United States and Central America. This issue is dealt with in 
great detail in a new study (Bunck and Fowler 2012).
Demographic, Social, and Economic Vulnerabilities
According to the UN study, “most street crime is committed by young men 
between the ages of 15 and 24, often against their peers. The higher the share 
this demographic group comprises of the population, the greater the number of 
potential perpetrators and victims in the society, all other things being equal” 
(UNODC 2007, 12). Violent crime is often attributed to economic factors as well. 
The report states that “studies of the correlates of crime have found that the dis-
tribution of wealth in a society is actually more signifi cant than raw poverty in 
predicting violence levels. It has been argued that stark wealth disparities provide 
criminals with both a justifi cation (addressing social injustice) and an opportu-
nity (wealth to steal) for their activities” (UNODC 2007, 12).
A Limited Capacity for Criminal Justice
The report’s third explanation for extremely high crime rates focuses on the 
Central American governments’ inability to enforce compliance with the law. It 
observes: “The citizenry, large portions of which may have traditionally regarded 
the law enforcement apparatus as the enemy, also needs time to learn to trust and 
cooperate with those charged with protecting them. Lingering suspicions teamed 
with transitional hiccoughs may strain this trust relationship. Corruption can de-
rail it altogether” (UNODC 2007, 29).
The justice and morality void left by state corruption and incapacity is often 
fi lled by gangs, vigilantes, and other local power brokers. Where the state tries to 
co-opt these actors, its legitimacy is called into question and the rule of law is re-
duced to an arbitrary standard of local preferences. The battles between the drug 
cartels, especially in Guatemala, and the “ethnic cleansing” seen in Guatemala 
are widely assumed to take place to some degree on the sufferance of the state.
Displacement and Deportation
A signifi cant Central American diaspora of generally extremely poor refugees 
reached the United States after fl eeing from the Central American civil wars of 
the 1980s and 1990s. Many policy makers in Central America claim that the de-
portation of large groups of illegal immigrants from the United States, many with 
criminal backgrounds, overwhelms their justice capacity and further destabilizes 
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the region (I will treat this issue later in this article). According to the UN re-
port, “There is a widely held belief in both Central America and the Caribbean 
that recent crime troubles can be tied directly to criminal deportees” (UNODC 
2007, 41).
A History of Confl ict and Authoritarianism
The report describes psychological trauma, a warlike mind-set, weak state ca-
pacity and legitimacy, and police militarization as legacies of the Central Ameri-
can civil wars. It suggests that “violence can become ‘normalized’ in communities 
where many people were exposed to brutality, and may be tacitly accepted as a 
legitimate way of settling disputes, particularly where the state continues to be 
viewed as incompetent, corrupt, or biased” (UNODC 2007, 34).
With the data organized in these fi ve categories, the UNODC report attempts 
to describe and explain broad aspects of the Central American crime problem, 
but it does not analyze cross-country variations in the manifestation of violence 
or the possible causes of violent crime. Rather, the result is a list of conditions that 
contribute to the problem of violence in general, without attempting to explain 
the variations across different countries. With the addition of the two factors re-
viewed earlier—the fragility of new democratic institutions and chronically low 
socioeconomic development—it is possible to begin to comprehend the context 
within which criminal activity takes place, including that involving the pandillas, 
and the seriousness of the danger it poses to these vulnerable societies. The main 
thrust of this article will be to seek factors, which turn out to be mainly political, 
that can explain variations in the emergence and impact of the pandillas through-
out Central America, and their implications for security.
BACKGROUND TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE PANDILLAS
Before going further, it is necessary to answer these questions: What is a pan-
dilla, and what makes a mara different from a pandilla? Basically, a pandilla is a 
street gang, while the term mara refers specifi cally to the gang known as MS-13, 
which began as a Los Angeles barrio gang called Mara Salvatrucha, made up of 
young Salvadoran immigrants whose parents had fl ed the civil war in the 1980s. 
While the exact derivation of the name is unclear, mara apparently signifi es a 
fi erce, tenacious type of Central American ant, salva stands for El Salvador, while 
trucha means something like “reliable” and “alert” in Salvadoran slang. While 
some observers refer to the 18th Street gang (also called Barrio 18 or Calle 18) as a 
mara, in that its members behave like the MS-13, they do not refer to themselves 
as a mara.
Youth gangs have been present in Central America’s main cities for decades. 
As early studies reported, street gangs used to be small bands of teenagers that 
operated in areas of larger cities and controlled their barrios or “turf” through the 
use of violence (Cruz 2007b, 13–19). During the civil wars and other confl icts that 
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devastated the region in the 1980s, these gangs were contained through the same 
mechanisms that the authoritarian regimes used to suppress political dissent and 
disorder: intense, often violent, repression. Besides this, the extreme militariza-
tion of these societies made it extremely diffi cult for young men to form groups 
or to engage in actions that might draw the attention of the authorities. Youth 
gangs certainly existed, and some of them were considered violent, but in the 
midst of widespread civil confl ict they drew little attention from the authoritarian 
regimes. They came dramatically to light, however, when the end of the internal 
confl icts exposed the problems of poverty, exclusion, and public insecurity that 
still characterized these societies.
The end of the authoritarian regimes and violent confl ict brought public atten-
tion to the problem. Local scholars and the media began to note the proliferation 
of these gangs in Central American cities. An early survey of crime in El Salva-
dor conducted in 1993 revealed that nearly 50 percent of the urban population 
said there were street gangs in their neighborhoods (Cruz 2011, 140; Levenson 
1998). Nevertheless, the governments did not initially acknowledge gangs as an 
important issue. One foreign researcher, Heidrun Zinecker, proposed a useful 
characterization of postwar Salvadoran security policies as consisting of three 
main phases (Zinecker 2007). The fi rst phase was a transition period in which 
new institutions of public security were established and little or no attention was 
paid to issues of crime and gangs. In the second phase, criminal violence and 
gangs came to the attention of the public security institutions, and some scattered 
measures and reforms were enacted to tackle the growing problem of crime. The 
third stage in the evolution of security policies was characterized by the enact-
ment of repressive, indiscriminately applied security policies that were wielded 
like “broad brush strokes,” using evocative names such as “zero tolerance” and 
mano dura (heavy hand). Cruz (2011, 142) points out that these plans were modeled 
to some degree on the zero-tolerance policies of large US cities like New York 
and encouraged by US law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the Drug 
Enforcement Agency, which were working with Central American governments 
to control crime.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GANG CULTURE MOVES TO CENTRAL AMERICA
In Los Angeles, California, the growing trade in marijuana and cocaine from 
Latin America, along with competition for turf, drove a spiral of escalating, un-
precedented violence in the 1990s between rival gangs. A major shift took place 
around this time, when many in the Mara Salvatrucha allied themselves with the 
Mexican Mafi a prison gang known as la eme, which controlled a signifi cant por-
tion of the cross-border drug trade (Sullivan 2008; Valdez 2005). It was at this time 
that the number 13 was added to the initials MS (m is the thirteenth letter of the 
alphabet), and came to signify affi liation with these extremely violent California 
gangs.
The most important measure to deal with gangs following the Cold War and 
the Central American confl ict, at least for Central America, was the implementa-
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tion of deportation laws for non-US citizens found guilty of a gang-related crime 
or determined to belong to a gang. The 1994 California law known as the three-
strikes law (from “three strikes and you’re out”) signifi cantly expanded the man-
datory prison sentences of recidivist criminals, which led to the imprisonment 
of thousands of Los Angeles gang members, including Central-American-born 
individuals. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act (IIRIRA) and Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act broadened the 
defi nition of aggravated felony to include violence, theft, bribery, obstruction of 
justice, and gambling offenses (previously considered misdemeanors), which al-
lowed deportation on any of these grounds. IIRIRA also applied the aggravated 
felony provision retroactively to gang members (GAO 2010, 5). Notwithstanding 
strong criticism on constitutional and human rights grounds and ongoing legal 
and legislative disputes, these laws were implemented, and the number of an-
nual deportations skyrocketed. With the Secure Communities program of the 
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) they grew further, with annual 
deportations up by 400 percent since 1996 (Funes 2008).3 The initial wave of de-
portations in the mid-1990s unquestionably infl uenced the dynamics and style of 
the Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 18 as they emerged in the region. The US policy 
of mass deportations of undocumented immigrants helped spread MS-13 and 
Calle 18 to Central America, where the local gang cultures quickly adapted to the 
California mara style.
NUMBERS OF GANG MEMBERS
Table 1 provides data on the number of gang members in the four countries. 
These data suggest two major puzzles: why the number of imprisoned gang 
members is higher in El Salvador than in Guatemala and Honduras, and why 
Nicaragua differs from the other three countries. I will deal with these puzzles 
subsequently in this article.
There are fundamental problems with the ways in which governments arrive 
at offi cial estimates of the numbers of gang members in their countries; they are 
arbitrary and not comparable from one country to another. There is no standard-
ized, objective basis for estimating gang membership or the total number of gang 
clicas (cells or component groups). In El Salvador, for example, the estimate of 
17,000 gang members nationwide is based on those who have been registered by 
the police or imprisoned at one time or another. Honduras derives its estimate 
somewhat bizarrely from a reading of gang graffi ti multiplied by some factor or 
other.4 If these most basic numbers are not reliable, how can any analysis of gang 
operations and their impact offer a sound basis for policy making?
3. For example, while in the early 1990s, the United States deported approximately 40,000 aliens per 
year, since the passage of these new laws, the number of deportees gradually increased by almost ten 
times (e.g., 359,000 in 2008) (Funes 2008).
4. The author learned this in a meeting with Subcomisario Renán David Galo Meza, chief of the 
Division for Prevention and Analysis of maras and pandillas of the police in Honduras, who developed 
the methodology for calculating numbers of gang members based on graffi ti, on August 1, 2008, in 
Tegucigalpa.
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El Salvador 17,000 Yes 7,000 66
Guatemala 32,000 Yes 400 42
Honduras 24,000 Yes 800 81
Nicaragua 4,500 No — 13
Sources: On homicides, UNODC 2011, 23. The gang numbers and presence of MS-13 and 18th Street 
are from material provided to the author by Dr. Humberto Posada of the Policía Nacional Civil, El 
Salvador, at antipandillas conferences held in San Salvador, El Salvador, in 2007 and 2008. The data 
on numbers in prison are from the author’s interview with Ismael Rodríguez Batres, deputy director 
general of prisons for El Salvador, March 27, 2009, San Salvador, and subsequent e-mail communica-
tion, March 13, 2009.
MOTIVATION FOR JOINING GANGS
Obviously, with a phenomenon as complicated as pandillas there can be no 
simple, monocausal explanation for why some Central American youth join 
gangs. If it were simply poverty, we would expect a higher gang membership 
in Nicaragua, by far the poorest of the four countries, rather than a lower mem-
bership and no presence so far of the MS-13 and Calle 18. The most credible 
studies I have reviewed emphasize a wide spectrum of factors encouraging 
membership in gangs. At least in part it is due to the attraction of the lifestyle 
(el vacil), a whole range of licit and illicit pursuits that promise fun and excite-
ment in the gang, along with family problems, a desire for support and respect, 
and peer pressure (Ranum 2011, 78; Demoscopía S.A. 2007, 13–42). We must keep 
in mind that  generally the design of studies on gang membership focuses only 
on poor barrios, which means that the youths interviewed are not selected in a 
random manner to represent the general population but from only the poorer 
neighborhoods.
By contrast, the results of self-reported surveys by pandillas, which have been 
mainly popularized by Mauricio Rubio, do not confi rm that all gang members 
come from poor backgrounds or that they have been expelled from school (Rubio 
2007). In the locations where the most credible survey was carried out, there are 
reports of connections between gangs and students. And among gang members, 
or pandilleros, there is no shortage of youths who report belonging to the middle 
and upper classes. With the possible exception of the survey carried out in San Pe-
dro Sula, Honduras, where being part of the privileged classes appears to nearly 
eliminate the possibility of being linked to the pandillas, in the other places sur-
veyed (Tegucigalpa, Managua, rural Nicaragua, and Panama) between 5 percent 
and 15 percent of the youth from favorable economic situations reported links to 
pandillas. In short, the data indicate that poverty in and of itself is not the expla-
nation for joining pandillas (Rubio 2007; 2011, 167–171). There is a wide spectrum 
P6424.indb   159 6/11/14   8:43:36 AM
160 Latin American Research Review
of factors, and this observation alone should suggest that a solution to gang prob-
lems is not simply socioeconomic.5
ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF GANGS OR PANDILLAS
At least for the outsider, the use of violence is the most defi ning characteristic 
of the pandillas and especially of MS-13 and Calle 18. Researchers estimate that 
gang members are murdered by the age of twenty-six.6 As part of the accession 
process, new members eventually have to kill a person, for no other reason than 
to show they can and to cement their bond with the gang. This implies that once a 
gang member has killed another, whether from a rival clica or some other group, 
the killer is marked and can never leave the gang. Gang initiation rites, which 
involve merciless beatings, can be fatal. Women are initiated either through beat-
ings or forced sex with some or all the male members of the clica. The pandillas 
fi ght very frequently, not only against the authorities but also against each other 
and members of their own group, for control of turf and markets, especially to sell 
drugs (Franco 2008; Seelke 2008, 2011).
The issue of the relationship between pandillas and homicide rates is ex-
tremely polemical. Newspapers and politicians in the region state that pandillas 
are responsible for a “good portion” of the homicides, including those involving 
dismemberment and other grotesque practices, or “just under half of all homi-
cides” (Seelke 2011, 5). The most recent UNODC report states that “[maras and 
pandillas] are extremely violent and responsible for a signifi cant share of homi-
cides in several of the region’s countries, where they are increasingly involved in 
extortion, intimidation and protection rackets” (UNODC 2011, 53). But no data is 
cited to back up this assertion. In short, added to the lack of reliable data on the 
number of pandilleros and clicas is the lack of reliable data on the percentage of 
homicides committed by gang members.
Street gangs typically are loosely organized and highly localized; leadership 
changes frequently and activities revolve around drug sales, petty crime, and turf 
battles. The MS-13 and Calle 18, unlike most other street gangs and pandillas, 
have shown a tendency in recent years to organize in a more traditionally hier-
archical manner and to coordinate their criminal activities not only across the 
United States but across North and Central America (Franco 2008, 8–9).
All observers agree that pandillas’ main source of income is la renta, extortion. 
They extort businesses in the neighborhoods or barrios: small shopkeepers, taxis 
and public transport drivers, and virtually any and all business conducted on 
their turf. The scale of extortion can be huge; in both San Salvador and Guatemala 
City public transportation has been held at ransom by the MS-13 and Calle 18, 
as gang members murder bus drivers to demonstrate their power and willing-
ness to use violence. For example, in September 2010 the MS-13 and 18th Street 
gangs jointly organized a three-day strike that paralyzed El Salvador’s trans-
5. In view of challenges in using standard social science methodologies to analyze gangs, for future 
research the author intends to use some form of social network analysis (Everton 2012).
6. José Miguel Cruz, personal communication, November 2, 2011.
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port system in response to new antigang legislation (Seelke 2011, 5). According 
to James W. Rose, regional gang advisor in San Salvador, the extent of extor-
tion by the gangs over the bus cooperatives in San Salvador alone in 2010 was 
$18 million.7
THE IMPACT OF MANO DURA POLICIES
While there is little agreement on why members join pandillas or on pandillas’ 
responsibility for the extremely high homicide rates, there is widespread agree-
ment on the very negative impact of the mano dura policies implemented in Hon-
duras and El Salvador and promised in campaign speeches by President Otto 
Pérez Molina in Guatemala. Mano dura policies, at least in terms of rhetoric, were 
inspired by zero-tolerance policies implemented in several North American cities 
oriented more toward penalizing wrongdoing than preventing it.
The indiscriminate policies used in Honduras and El Salvador entailed the 
enactment of special laws, executive acts, and the rewriting of criminal codes to 
allow the police and different law enforcement agencies to round up, incarcerate, 
and prosecute gang members and any youth suspected of criminal activities. In 
2003, the government of Honduran president Ricardo Maduro revised Article 332 
of the Penal Code to make gang members subject to prosecution for member-
ship in a criminal organization, regardless of whether they or their group had 
been convicted of any crime. In El Salvador, where the mano dura type of policy 
reached its highest level of sophistication, an anti-mara law was enacted in July 
2003 under the government of Francisco Flores. This act, known as Ley Antimaras, 
also aimed to facilitate the detention and prosecution of suspected gang members 
based on the newly defi ned felony of “illicit association” (asociación ilícita) and 
gang membership. In both cases, the new rulings gave complete authority to the 
police—and in some cases to military personnel—to carry out arrests based on 
arbitrary decisions and thin evidence. In El Salvador police could use the pres-
ence of tattoos, hand signals, some dress codes, and physical appearance as evi-
dence of gang membership. Although this specifi c directive was not included in 
the Honduran law, Honduran police acted on the basis of similar criteria, jailing 
even children who happened to be dressed like gang members (Thale and Falken-
burger 2006).
In Guatemala, although legal measures were not passed to support the anti-
gang crackdowns, the police implemented suppression plans based on arbitrary 
interpretations of the existing laws. The general term referring to these policies 
was Plan Escoba (Operation Broom). The police jailed youth they suspected of 
gang membership by indicting them for possession of drugs, despite the fact that 
most of those detentions were carried out illegally. In short, public security in-
stitutions were in effect given a license to hunt gangs and youth based on weak 
legal constraints.
These broad-brush policies were essentially plans for suppressive police in-
7. Author’s interview with Mr. James W. Rose, regional gang advisor, US Embassy, San Salvador, 
April 1, 2011.
P6424.indb   161 6/11/14   8:43:36 AM
162 Latin American Research Review
tervention. Honduras and El Salvador approved laws allowing security forces to 
pursue and capture youths suspected of belonging to a gang without evidence or 
due process (Aguilar and Miranda 2006; Andino 2007). In these countries, as well 
as in Guatemala, the governments used such plans as linchpins for larger gov-
ernment agendas; all used the armed forces in operations against gangs; and all 
developed operations that allowed for the capture and mass incarceration of gang 
members, thus saturating and overpopulating their prisons. A major problem is 
that the prison systems could not, and cannot, support this level of incarcera-
tion. For example, in El Salvador, in early 2011 the prison system had suffi cient 
space for 8,000 prisoners; at that time there were 24,600 imprisoned, at least one-
third of these for gang-related crimes.8 In Guatemala between June 2003 and June 
2004, 10,527 persons were detained for drug possession and an additional 11,708 
were detained for petty crimes in “preventive” centers set up in the Department 
(district) of Guatemala, which contains the capital, Guatemala City (Ranum 2011, 
77–78). These arrests represented 49.3 percent of all incarcerations made in that 
one department. Only 1.1 percent of the arrests for drug possession, however, 
were then formally indicted by the courts. In most of the cases, the judge either 
did not fi nd suffi cient evidence or determined that the evidence was collected il-
legally, meaning that the detention was illegal (Ranum 2011, 79).
One of the puzzles in table 1 is the disparity between the rate of incarceration 
of pandilla members in El Salvador and those in the other two countries. Due 
to an arrangement in place since 2005, the Salvadoran police (Policía Nacional 
Civil, PNC) and the district attorneys jointly conduct investigations of criminal 
activities. They have seventy-two hours to decide whether or not they are going to 
charge a suspect. If they go ahead with prosecution, the suspect goes before one 
of eight special judges in the country who deal with gang crimes. If not, the sus-
pect is set free. The legal system and the process for dealing with suspected gang 
activity thus are relatively sound; gang members who are convicted go to prison 
for long sentences of up to thirty years. As one informant on this issue put it, what 
is different in Guatemala and Honduras is that “There is no follow-through.”9 
Indeed, Guatemalan legal expert Javier Monterroso Castillo notes the total lack of 
effectiveness in his country’s criminal proceedings, in which only 2.7 percent of 
criminal cases result in conviction. He concludes that the criminal investigation 
system has totally collapsed in Guatemala (Castillo 2007, 73, 158). Judging from 
the author’s interviews in Tegucigalpa in August 2008, the situation in Honduras 
is little different. Indeed, the data in the table illustrate this point: of 24,000 known 
pandilla members in Honduras, only 800 are imprisoned, even though Honduras 
also has a mano dura policy.10 In one interview with the author, a US government 
8. Author interview with Edgardo Amaya, advisor, Ministry of Justice and Public Security, San Sal-
vador, April 1, 2011.
9. Author interview with Ismael Rodríguez Batres, deputy director general of prisons for El Salvador, 
March 27, 2009, San Salvador, and subsequent e-mail communication, March 13, 2009.
10. These data are from author interview with Rodríguez Batres. The information on Guatemala is 
from a Guatemalan PowerPoint presentation from the 2008 antipandillas conference; the Honduran 
data were obtained from the director of prisons. See also Sánchez Velásquez 2008.
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offi cial stated bluntly that there is competition rather than cooperation between 
the Honduran police and the district attorneys.11
To begin to comprehend these policies, one must understand the political dy-
namics in this region, where politicians are expected to “do something” to show 
they do not tolerate widespread crime and violence. For politicians, security be-
came the issue in the early 1990s, a situation that continues to the present. The 
problem is that the policies are counterproductive. After homicide rates initially 
decreased with implementation of mano dura, within two years they reached, 
and then exceeded, the previous rates. Analysts demonstrate that the mano dura 
policies actually facilitated gang organization and recruitment, due to the simul-
taneous incarceration of thousands of youth gang members and “wannabes.” It 
was within the prisons that dozens of members from widespread regional cli-
cas of the same gang were fi rst able to establish contact with each other, recog-
nize that their gangs consisted of a myriad of uncoordinated groups, and work 
together to develop more structured organizations. Incarceration enabled gang 
members to function as a sort of permanent assembly in which they could debate, 
make pacts, and decide on structures, strategies, and ways to operate that had to 
be observed by the members of all the clicas. This was made even easier, in part, 
by the decision of the authorities to separate prisoners according to their gang af-
fi liation to cut down on intergang violence within the prisons (Cruz 2011, 155).12 
The broad-brush laws, by sweeping up gang members from several countries, 
also facilitated communications and connections at the international level among 
gang members.
GANGS AND ORGANIZED CRIME
The defi nition of organized crime is so loose that while any gang would prob-
ably be considered organized crime, there is little meaning to this appellation.13 
I agree with one of the most astute observers of the pandillas, Sonja Wolf, that 
while the gangs are involved with organized crime, they are still not, themselves, 
what most observers would term organized crime (Wolf 2012b, 272). However, 
there is a dynamic at work that has led some of the pandillas to more closely ap-
proximate organized crime. As noted above, one of the many negative aspects of 
the massive incarceration of youth is putting them into close contact in the pris-
ons with organized crime groups that have long operated from the prisons. These 
11. Author meeting with offi cial in charge of security for US embassy personnel in Tegucigalpa on 
July 30, 2008.
12. In 2001, both El Salvador and Honduras implemented such a policy. In practice, this has led to 
certain jails being known as Mara Salvatrucha jails or 18th Street jails. In Guatemala, this measure was 
implemented in 2005 after a series of prison massacres committed by one gang against the other.
13. According to Article 2 of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, signed in 
December 2000, organized crime is defi ned as any “structured group of three or more persons existing 
for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or 
offenses . . . in order to obtain, directly, or indirectly, a fi nancial or other material benefi t” (Giraldo and 
Trinkunas 2009, 352).
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contacts ultimately provided money, guns, and other resources to the pandillas. 
They also provided the opportunity to wield some power within the criminal 
networks that operated from the prisons. This power was exerted not only over 
other gang members and clicas but also over networks that involved other violent 
actors, including organized crime groups. As one of the most respected Central 
American experts puts it, “In the end, incarcerating thousands of mareros pro-
vided the conditions for the gangs to institutionalize and organize; reshaped and 
strengthened the criminal networks already operating in these countries; and 
reinforced the bonds between the violent actors inside and outside state institu-
tions” (Cruz 2011, 156).
Further factors that lead some observers toward defi ning the gangs as orga-
nized crime are those that show them to be increasingly sophisticated and orga-
nized. These include their more systematic use of intelligence in their activities; 
their regional and even international networks; their extensive use of extortion 
to fi nance their organizations and some of their activities; and their methods of 
laundering money, for example from extortion, by sending it via Western Union 
to the United States and then having it sent back in the form of workers’ remit-
tances. Edgardo Amaya, who was at the time of our interview an advisor in the 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security, El Salvador, considers many of the main 
gangs, especially MS-13 and Calle 18, to have evolved into a form of organized 
crime.14
PANDILLAS AND SECURITY
Probably the biggest disconnect in the study of pandillas is the gap between 
their implications for security and the data available. The serious student of pan-
dillas is doubly handicapped in attempting to analyze the implications of the pan-
dillas for security, fi rst by the totally arbitrary and unreliable data on the number 
of pandilleros and clicas, and second by the lack of reliable data on the percentage 
of homicides committed by pandilleros.
We know from the 2010 Latinobarómetro that an increasing percentage of the 
population in the region views crime as the most serious societal problem. We 
also know that presidential candidates run on hard-line platforms and, even in 
the case of President Mauricio Funes, who did not run on this platform, imple-
ment policies to combat the pandillas once they are elected. But none of the lit-
erature from the region deals with the implications of the pandillas for security, 
maybe because it is written by researchers who are methodologically aware and 
are thus sensitive to the lack of reliable data. On the other hand, virtually all of the 
offi cial studies and the programs from the United States focus on the implications 
of the pandillas for security, in the region and in the United States (United States 
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control 2011; Seelke 2011; GAO 2010).
At a commonsense level, however, we can observe something on this topic. If 
we consider three possible levels of security—citizen, public, and national—we 
14. Edgardo Amaya, interview with author, San Salvador, April 1, 2011. It should be noted that Amaya 
was a recognized expert on pandillas even before entering government (Amaya 2005).
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can note the following (Kincaid 2000, 40–41). At the citizen security level the pan-
dillas are a serious threat in that they rob, extort, kill, and generally threaten large 
sectors of the population, especially those in poorer sections of larger cities. At the 
public security level they are also a serious threat in that they halt public transpor-
tation routinely, to demonstrate their power, by killing the drivers, as they have 
done periodically in Guatemala City and San Salvador. In one notorious case in 
the Barrio of Mejicanos in El Salvador on June 21, 2010, members of the 18th Street 
gang doused a bus with gasoline, burning alive the passengers. Through their 
extortion of businesses in the bigger cities, they also challenge public security. As 
there is an identifi ed tendency for the pandillas to resemble organized crime, at 
the level of national security they also should be considered a threat in El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, and Honduras, which remain fragile democracies with relatively 
poorly articulated political institutions and very tentative popular support. With 
this basic understanding of the pandillas and their effect on security, it is impor-
tant to evaluate offi cial responses in the four countries of Central America and 
beyond.
OFFICIAL RESPONSES TO THE GANGS: DOMESTIC POLITICS IN THE REGION
In view of the threats to security, once we consider the domestic politics in the 
four countries in the region, it becomes clearer why El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras have implemented mano dura policies and Nicaragua has not. This 
consideration can help us to better understand the data in table 1. At the simplest 
level, in Nicaragua the security forces—the armed forces and the police—are a 
legacy of the revolutionary success of the FSLN: they were trained by the Cu-
bans, East Germans, and others in the Warsaw Pact to establish a presence and 
conduct surveillance within the society. In this context the government allowed 
minimal space for the international pandillas to enter and establish themselves. 
Because they are not established, the government did not, and does not, have to 
develop a new approach to deal with what was a nonexistent problem.15 In the 
other three countries, Cruz has convincingly argued that the political incentives 
of the elected politicians result in mano dura policies but not in public policies 
that can effectively deal with the many and complicated causal factors behind 
pandillas’ emergence and growth. A decade of fi rsthand observations and inter-
views by the author validate his argument. Even before the mano dura policies 
were implemented, the high-level police offi cials I interviewed in El Salvador and 
Honduras said they were pessimistic about any positive, long-term impact from 
these policies.16 Given the almost intractable problem of the gangs and gang vio-
lence, and because presidential terms are four years with no reelection (fi ve years 
in El Salvador), mano dura policies, even if shown to be failures, are the obvious 
15. In addition to this political explanation, experts highlight the nature of immigration and availa-
bility of public land. See Rocha 2011.
16. These author interviews include Dr. Humberto Posada of the Policía Nacional Civil, El Salvador, 
and Subcomisario Renán David Galo Meza, chief of the Division for Prevention and Analysis of maras 
and pandillas of the Honduran police.
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fi rst choice of elected politicians who want to appear responsive to their elector-
ate’s concerns. This, unfortunately, is verifi ed by Mauricio Funes, the fi rst FMLN 
president in El Salvador, whose initial policies were no more enlightened than 
those of his authoritarian ARENA predecessors (Wolf 2011a, 14).17 The campaign 
promises of the successful candidate in the November 2011 Guatemalan presiden-
tial elections, Otto Pérez Molina, were equally slanted toward policies to crack 
down on gang membership.
OFFICIAL RESPONSES TO GANGS: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
In terms of international meetings, statements, and gestures, there is an over-
whelming response to the security challenge posed by the gangs.18 The United 
States, the European Union, and international fi nancial institutions including 
the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank are engaged in ef-
forts to bolster security. At a meeting in Guatemala City on June 21, 2011, alone, 
these organizations committed $1 billion for “security efforts in Central Amer-
ica” over the next two years.19 According to the same report, the United States 
will contribute a separate $300 million for security, in addition to the $200 mil-
lion promised by US president Barack Obama during his visit to El Salvador in 
March 2011.
One might wonder why the United States government is even interested in 
pandillas, as demonstrated by a huge number of offi cial publications, task forces, 
and assistance to the region. Despite early allegations of links between interna-
tional terrorism and pandillas, there is no credible evidence making this link. 
Rather US interest is due to the combination of the presence of the MS-13 and 
18th Street gangs in many US cities, and concern with failing states in Central 
America.
To understand what is politically and bureaucratically possible regarding US 
assistance to improve security in Central America, we must fi rst consider three 
essential facts. First, even with their relatively abundant resources and a fi rmly 
established rule of law, many US cities have not been successful at doing much 
more than containing gangs. The most obvious cases involving the MS-13 and 
17. Since March 2012 the government of El Salvador has been encouraging a “truce” between MS-13 
and Calle 18 that has resulted in a decrease of homicides. The long-term implications of the truce remain 
to be seen. El Faro reports on this. See “Sala Negra” of ElFaro.net. In the author’s interview with Minister 
of Justice and Public Security David Muguía Payés in San Salvador on May 15, 2012, Muguía would 
not acknowledge that the government had been directly involved in the negotiations, and he would 
not use the term “negotiations,” but he made it clear that the motivation of the leaders of MS-13 and 
18th Street was to get out of the high-security prisons, and if this were done they were willing to direct 
their followers to cut back on the homicides. As he estimated that 90 percent of the leaders were in the 
maximum-security prison of Zacatecoluca, and the pandillas are very hierarchical, he was sanguine 
that the orders would be followed.
18. For example, annual antipandilla conferences were held in San Salvador with US support bet-
ween 2005 and 2008; the US Southern Command in Miami held a two-day workshop on pandillas in 
November 2004; and the US Department of State published “Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal 
Gangs from Central America and Mexico” (US Department of State 2007).
19. CNN Wire Staff, “Report: World Bank Pledges $1 Billion for Central American Security,” June 22, 
2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/06/22/central.america.security.
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18th Street gangs include Los Angeles, northern Virginia, and New Jersey (Na-
tional Gang Intelligence Center 2011). Second, the United States has no national 
police force. The nearest equivalent, the FBI, has a number of domestic and in-
ternational initiatives, including the MS-13 National Gang Task Force, National 
Gang Strategy, National Gang Intelligence Center, and Transnational Anti-Gang 
Initiative, but it does not have the mandate of a national police force like those in 
Central America. This results in major bureaucratic impediments to cooperation 
between US federal law enforcement agencies and Central American national po-
lice forces. The Regional Gang Advisor in San Salvador stated simply that his 
offi ce, which is part of the US Department of State, Bureau of International Nar-
cotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), cannot work with the region’s armed 
forces.20 Third, in the United States the military is prohibited from domestic law 
enforcement, whereas in Central America military personnel either back up the 
national police or, at times, as in Guatemala and Honduras, even supplant them. 
I cannot imagine the US military becoming involved in combating gangs in Cen-
tral America. These three facts should suggest modesty in any US approach to 
“solving” the problems of pandillas and security in Central America.
Nevertheless, there are several US initiatives, but they do indeed encounter 
several bureaucratic challenges. Building on the January 2007 “Strategy to Com-
bat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico,” the Mérida 
Initiative, signed in 2007 and funded in 2008, was welcomed in Mexico and Cen-
tral America, where some viewed it as the “fi rst big effort” by the United States 
to fi ght gangs in Mexico and Central America. Despite all the good intentions, 
however, the initiative was slow to start. The fi rst problem was an ongoing dis-
pute among competing agencies in Washington over the need to balance security 
and law enforcement requirements with funding for institution building. There 
was also disagreement over what would be the most suitable types and levels of 
security assistance for the region, an argument that resulted in the US Congress 
approving an increase in the budget for prevention and economic and social de-
velopment programs (Seelke and Beittel 2009; Seelke 2010). The second problem 
was the diffi culty of tracing and accounting for Mérida funds, given that the State 
Department lacks a consolidated database and each agency uses its own method 
to track funds (GAO 2009). A third diffi culty was the delay in the availability and 
delivery of funds and programs. The State Department was slow to submit the 
mandatory reports to Congress prior to the obligation of any Mérida funds, and 
the initiative suffered from an initial lack of institutional capacity within both the 
benefi ciary governments and the responsible US agencies. Unfortunately, as the 
author’s research in El Salvador and Guatemala in spring 2011 demonstrated, 
these types of bureaucratic problems continue. The fourth problem, one that is 
related to the previous problem, is weak interagency cooperation, due to persis-
tent confusion, a general lack of coordination, and turf battles among the various 
US agencies involved in the implementation of the Mérida Initiative. For example, 
the funds to be disbursed via INL are channeled through the INL offi ce in Mexico 
City rather than through the US embassies in the Central American countries 
20. James W. Rose, interview with author, US Embassy, San Salvador, April 1, 2011.
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themselves, causing yet more bureaucratic friction and impeding implementa-
tion of programs (United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control 
2011, 6).21
For Central America, the Mérida Initiative has been replaced by the Central 
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Between fi scal year 2008 and fi scal 
year 2012, $361.5 million had been allocated (United States Senate Caucus on In-
ternational Narcotics Control 2011, 30). And, by mid-2013 $1.2 billion had been al-
located to CARSI and non-CARSI funding that supports CARSI goals (GAO 2013, 
9). However, the stated priorities—to ensure safe streets, disrupt movement of 
criminals and contraband, support development of strong and accountable gov-
ernments, raise the effective presence of states in communities at risk, and foster 
enhanced levels of security and rule of law—are not specifi cally about pandillas. 
According to a CRS report on CARSI (Meyer and Seelke 2011, 23–27) and the Sen-
ate Caucus Report (United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Con-
trol 2011), and buttressed by the author’s interviews, most recently in Guatemala 
in the spring of 2011 and in El Salvador in spring of 2011 and 2012, the initiatives 
are fairly meager.22 They include the FBI’s Transnational Anti-Gang Initiative 
(TAG), the FBI’s Central American Fingerprint Exploitation Initiative (CAFE), and 
US Agency for International Development (USAID) assistance programs for at-
risk youth in the region. These are all useful initiatives, but given the size of the 
problems, they are very modest.
While the funding and implementation of the programs are still in the initial 
stages and the results remain to be seen, the massive deportation of “illegals” 
from the United States to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras is an obvious 
problem for the Central American countries. According to data from the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, in 2010 the total number of individuals deported was 
387,242, of whom 73 percent were Mexicans. The next leading countries of origin 
were Guatemala, 8 percent (29,378); Honduras, 6 percent (24,611); and El Salva-
dor, 5 percent (19,809); only 1,847 Nicaraguans were deported (US Department of 
Homeland Security 2011, table 3). This means that each week in 2010, the United 
States deported 1,420 persons to these three countries. Regardless of the popular-
ity of deporting these individuals from the United States, which is justifi ed in 
terms of security, their arrival in these poor countries is correctly perceived as 
putting a huge strain on the already fragile and strained infrastructure. Currently, 
with the Secure Communities program, deportations are increasingly rapid, and, 
according to one analysis, 93 percent of those deported are Latinos, although they 
compose 77 percent of the undocumented population in the United States (Kohli, 
Markowitz, and Chavez 2011, 2). These issues are increasingly political and po-
lemical in the United States (see for example Siskin 2012).
21. It is important to note that the types of bureaucratic problems highlighted by the GAO (December 
2009 and April 2010), are reiterated in the Senate Caucus Report (United States Senate Caucus on Inter-
national Narcotics Control 2011).
22. The author conducted interviews in both countries with gang experts in the U.S. embassies (INL 
in El Salvador and USAID in Guatemala), local police and military offi cers, Ministry of Justice and 
Public Security offi cials in El Salvador, members of local nongovernmental organizations in both coun-
tries, and ex–gang members in Guatemala.
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CONCLUSION
The issue of pandillas and security must be understood from a political per-
spective. Domestically in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, political incen-
tives aim to suppress them, even if all observers recognize that this strategy does 
not work. In the United States, the main priority is to deport “illegals” to Central 
America for security purposes. In seeking to implement international antigang 
programs, the United States has yet to overcome serious bureaucratic barriers and 
inertia. While these programs might be useful on the margins, in light of the 
evidence it seems apparent that they will not have much lasting impact, given the 
dimensions of the challenge. Indeed, even with the $1.2 billion appropriated by 
the United States between 2008 and 2013, by all accounts the crime and violence 
problems have grown worse in the region. The pandilla problem is one for which 
there are no magic solutions. Like other kinds of crime or natural disasters, it can 
possibly be reduced but never eliminated, a truism for Central America given the 
region’s violent history, ingrained offi cial corruption, and chronic poverty. As in 
combating crime or preparing for natural disasters, both of which require unre-
mitting preparation and vigilance, fi ghting gangs is also an endless anticipatory, 
strategic, and preparatory process, aimed at minimizing to the degree possible 
the levels of violence, crime, and loss of life and property. So far, the author has 
not seen anything like the necessary political commitment to deal seriously with 
the issue either in Central America or in the United States.
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